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Jews,	  Jesus,	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  postcolonial	  French	  identity	  
Kimberly A. Arkin   
 
In late 2004, the Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF), the largest French Jewish 
university students’ union, organized a public relations campaign targeting the resurgence of 
anti-Semitism that began in the early 2000s.  The campaign—which was scheduled to run in 
major French publications—consisted of images of Jesus and Mary “tagged” with the words 
“sale juif” or “sale juive” [dirty Jew] and subtitled: “l’antisémitisme: et si c’était l’affaire de 
tous?” [anti-Semitism, what if it were everyone’s concern?] (figures 1 and 2).  Immediately, the 
LICRA, the Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme [International League 
Against Anti-Semitism and Racism], an anti-racist organization created at the turn of the century 
to fight Eastern European pogroms, pronounced the campaign “shocking,” noting that the 
association of religious images with anti-Semitic language would “have a counter productive 
effect and fuel already existing tensions in French society” (Le Nouvel Observateur 2004a).  The 
LICRA demanded that the UEJF cancel or amend the campaign immediately (Chabert 2004).   
Shortly thereafter, the UEJF’s then president, Yonathan Arfi, announced that the media 
campaign had “already obtained its objective” and would be cancelled (Le Nouvel Observateur 
2004b).   
Insert Figures 1 and 2. 
Certainly, the UEJF’s choice of imagery was provocative and surprising.  The use of 
Jesus and Mary seemed to highlight the irony of Christian anti-Semitism at a time when scholars 
and political observers insisted that contemporary French anti-Semitism was “new,” no longer 
the work of Catholics or ethno-nationalists, but of Muslims and recent immigrants (cf. Brenner 
2002; Finkielkraut 2003; Taguieff 2002).  More surprising still was the reaction the images 
provoked.  The Catholic Church offered no official condemnation, refusing to say anything since 
the ad was never formally launched.  Instead, the LICRA, a group with close ties to French 
Jewish institutions, objected to images Arfi called “fundamentally Christian” (Chabert 2004).  
Why would a group affiliated with Jewish interests work to stop the UEJF’s campaign?  What 
might the LICRA have seen that so alarmed it?  And why pay any attention to this seeming 
tempest in a teapot?  What, if anything, can these unseen and un-seeable pictures of Jesus and 
Mary tell us about the relationship between the fight against anti-Semitism and national identity 
in pluralist France? 
Following a long anthropological tradition (e.g. Gluckman 2014; Gluckman 1940; Scott 
1987; Turner 1996), I use this conflict over representation to explore what some groups thought 
should neither be seen nor said about the relationship between France and its constituent 
religious groups.  However, I do not and cannot offer a positivistic analysis of this conflict.1  As 
we will see below, Arfi may never have fully understood the LICRA’s objections; and the 
LICRA itself was both contradictory and opaque about its concerns.  Furthermore, none but a 
handful of militants [active organization members] ever engaged the images.  Nevertheless, I 
suggest that understanding why the campaign could not be seen offers insights into the limits of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  men	  and	  women	  of	  the	  UEJF	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  and	  most	  particularly	  Yonathan	  Arfi,	  for	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  teach	  me	  about	  their	  organization,	  interests,	  and	  concerns.	  	  This	  article	  has	  benefited	  enormously	  from	  the	  time,	  care,	  and	  critical	  sensibilities	  of	  a	  number	  of	  colleagues	  and	  mentors,	  particularly	  John	  Comaroff,	  Joanna	  Davidson,	  Naomi	  Davidson,	  and	  Robert	  Weller.	  	  I	  also	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Public	  Culture’s	  two	  anonymous	  reviewers,	  who	  helped	  me	  figure	  out	  what	  this	  article	  could	  and	  could	  not	  do.	  	  	  All	  translations	  are	  mine,	  as	  are	  all	  inaccuracies	  and	  analytical	  defects.	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national belonging in France.  So instead of straightforward sociological analysis, 2 I offer 
several culturally and contextually informed interpretations.  These interpretations are grounded 
in participant observation with the UEJF and other Jewish institutions in the mid-2000s, as well 
as in interviews with some of the campaign’s producers.  My analysis emphasizes the 
impossibility of one definitive interpretation, an impossibility that destabilized the idea that there 
is a “core” (however constituted) to French identity.  And therein lay the principal problem.  I 
argue that while the UEJF intended the campaign to be provocative for what it suggested about 
anti-Semitism, it may ultimately have been most problematic to the LICRA for what it implied 
about “Frenchness.”  Making Jesus a victim of anti-Semitism jeopardized mainstream Jewish 
institutional strategies that relied on a stable French national core to produce Jewish belonging in 
France.  
 
The “Jewish Question” 
Discussions of anti-Semitism in France are almost always also conversations about the 
limits of national belonging.  The LICRA’s condemnation of the campaign suggests that it 
irritated French Jewish institutional approaches to belonging in some way.  But why pay 
attention to this irritation?  In comparison with Muslim belonging, Jewish “Frenchness” is hardly 
a major public preoccupation for anybody in France today, except of course for Jews 
themselves.3  So why focus on constructions of national identity tied to Jewish belonging?  I here 
plead for a certain analytical rehabilitation of the “Jewish question.”  Social science inquiry in 
the 19th century was tied, at least in part, to the Jewish question.  From the late 18th century to the 
early 20th century, at a time when European states and elites wrestled with changes in their 
political and social worlds, Jews and Jewishness were, to borrow Levi-Strauss’ phrase, “good to 
think with.”  And this was true regardless of the (often odious) political or theoretical 
engagements of the authors in question. 4  This is no longer the case.  Over a decade ago, 
anthropologist Matti Bunzl (2004:5) noted how little social science was being done on 
contemporary European Jews.  When such work appeared, Bunzl argued that it was often in a 
nostalgic vein, thereby echoing Zionist discourse about the impossibility of a Jewish future in 
Europe.  Bunzl’s observation continues to hold.  With some exceptions, 5 European Jews seldom 
feature as a group whose self-presentation and practices are key to understanding contemporary 
permutations of nationalism or European identity.  Instead, Jews appear as victims of a “new” 
(read Muslim) anti-Semitism (Bunzl 2007; Brenner 2004; Taguieff 2002; Trigano 2003b; 
Trigano 2003a).  In this framework, Muslims have become the minority that scholars are using to 
analyze the promises, paradoxes, and problems associated European national communities, 
including France (Asad 2003; Bowen 2007; Bowen 2009; Fernando 2014; Laurence 2012; 
Laurence and Vaisse 2005).   
There are obviously good empirical and theoretical reasons for this shift.  But, as my 
analysis of the UEJF campaign will suggest, there are also drawbacks.  The shift implies a 
“supersessionist” story in which Muslims replace Jews as problem “minorities,” thus signaling 
Jewish normalization in “post-modern” or pluricultural European societies, (e.g. Benbassa 2004; 
Bunzl 2007; Lehrer 2013).6  It also presumes that European nation-states now legally and 
publicly embrace (some) pluricultural practices in unprecedented ways, thus signaling the end of 
homogenizing nationalist aspirations (e.g. Bunzl 2004; Geschiere 2009; Holmes 2000).  Thus, 
given time, European Muslims may become like Jews, just another component of pluralist 
European landscapes (Benbassa 2004; Bowen 2009; Laurence and Vaisse 2005).  
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All of this ignores the overdetermined ways in which many Jewish institutions, as well as 
everyday Jews, must continuously negotiate their (provisional) inclusion into French national 
imaginaries.  In other words, understanding Muslim exclusion in contemporary France and 
elsewhere may require coming to terms with the continued (if transformed) liminality of 
European Jews.  Instead of celebrating Jewish inclusion as a triumph of pluralism, I use the 
silenced UEJF ad to probe Jewish institutional anxieties about the conditions of that inclusion, 
anxieties that may in fact help shore-up narrow, homogenous imaginaries of the nation.   
 
The Nation in Crisis 
 Before analyzing the Jesus campaign, it must be placed in the political context of early 
2000s France and the sociological context of the UEJF as an organization.  Living in France 
between 2003 and 2005, I experienced first hand the crisis around French national identity.  Both 
Republican and ethno-nationalist models of French identity seemed disconnected from everyday 
concerns about identity-driven dissent and violence, raising questions about whether any kind of 
French “core” might (be made to) hold.  In 2004, recorded acts of anti-Semitism reached an 
almost 20 year high, with other forms of racism not far behind (Commission nationale 
consultative des droits de l’homme 2015).  In March 2005, high school students demonstrating 
against proposed education reforms were violently attacked by casseurs, youth who beat 
protestors and stole their valuables while apparently maligning “whites” and “French people” 
(Bronner 2005).  The violence led a Jewish group—with the backing of a number of Jewish 
intellectuals—to launch a petition against “anti-white” and “anti-French” racism (Agence France 
Press 2005).  And in November of the same year, after two adolescents hiding from the police 
were electrocuted in a transformer, young people rioted in banlieues all across France, burning 
cars and destroying schools, police and fire stations, and community centers.  For some public 
intellectuals and government officials, the nightly destruction in neighborhoods closely 
associated with the brown, black, and Muslim bodies of “immigrants” was further proof—if any 
were needed—of France’s descent into communautarisme, or ethnicized fracture (e.g. Bensimon 
2005; Cypel 2005). 
 The more “civil” parts of French society were simultaneously headed into their own 
forms of identitarian mobilization.  From 2003 to 2005, French civil society groups were 
engaged in a concurrence des victimes, a seemingly zero sum war among victims for public and 
government recognition (Benbassa 2006; Chaumont 2010; Trigano 2003b; Trigano 2006).  As 
scholars like Maud Mandel (2014) have documented, this was the moment when the multiethnic 
anti-racist organizations forged in the 1980s splintered along ethno-religious lines.  French 
Jewish organizations and their anti-racist allies—e.g. SOS-Racisme and the LICRA—stopped 
fighting anti-Semitism and racism together, arguing that anti-Semitism had a distinctive 
genealogy and etiology; furthermore, these groups argued, Muslim and/or North African victims 
of racism were guilty of anti-Semitism, making it impossible to fight both problems 
simultaneously (Bernard 2004a; Bernard 2004b; Cicurel 2004; Zappi 2004).  Antiracist groups 
more closely associated with recent immigrants—e.g. the Mouvement contre le racism et pour 
l’amitié entre les peuples [MRAP, Movement against racism and for friendship among peoples] 
and the Ligue des droits de l’homme [LDH, League for Human Rights]—made just the opposite 
argument, refusing to fight anti-Semitism without invoking Islamophobia and racism.  At the 
same time, social groups that had never before been “represented” in the public sphere by 
national associations were organizing.  After decades of failed attempts, the French government 
created a Muslim consistory, the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman [CFCM], a religious 
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umbrella organization designed to provide a hierarchical interface between the government and 
French “Muslims” (c.f. Bowen 2009).  And independently, French blacks created their own 
representative council, the Conseil Représentatif des associations noires [CRAN], taking as their 
model the secular Jewish Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France [CRIF] 
(Gabizon 2005; c.f. Boulègue et al. 2007).   
 As response and provocation in this new climate, the center-right government launched 
two public debates, the first about laïcité, often translated as secularism, and the second about 
national identity.  Both of these debates unleashed sparring among those with different visions of 
what France was and should be.  Should France return to Jacobin forms of Republicanism, 
reinforcing a single, homogenous legal and political framework that would serve as a common 
foundation for national belonging?  Was France instead a cultural collectivity rooted in ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic particularities?  Could France find ways of accommodating public 
pluralism without jeopardizing a commitment to living together?  If so, how?  On the heels of 
these debates, the government drafted legislation designed to shore up Republican legal 
principles as a foundation for “Frenchness.”  In early 2004, the government banned “ostentatious 
religious symbols” from public schools as a way of fighting a host of social ills associated with 
visible religious difference, including anti-Semitism, sexism, Islamism, and communautarisme 
(Stasi 2003).  In mid-2006, the government introduced new residency requirements for 
immigrants, including a mandatory contrat d’accueil et d’intégration [welcome and integration 
contract] that signaled signatories’ commitment to “Republican integration” while authorizing 
the government to deny visa renewals to contract breakers (Assemblée nationale 2006).  But, as 
theorists have repeatedly shown, contractual frameworks for thinking the nation almost always 
imply an ethno-cultural content (Silverman 1992; Silverstein 2004; Wilder 2005).  It is therefore 
hardly surprising that the 2004 law was instantly known as “the law against the veil,” signaling 
the public’s particular discomfort with Muslim—not Jewish or Christian—forms of religiosity.  
It was also not surprising that during the same period the government passed legislation that 
contributed to the concurrence des victimes; a 2005 bill “recognized” and encouraged the 
teaching of France’s “positive role” in its former overseas colonies, particularly North Africa, 
thus reinforcing the presumption that “France” was isomorphic with white, ostensibly Christian 
colonizers (Assemblée nationale 2005).  In this explosive context the UEJF, along with the 
LICRA and other organizations, worked to fight anti-Semitism while articulating what it might 
mean to be a good French national.  
 
Enter Jesus 
How did the UEJF understand anti-Semitism and its relationship to French belonging?  
The answer is complicated.  The UEJF is the largest Jewish university student union in France.  
It has a constantly changing, young membership and is not focused on a single issue or aspect of 
Jewishness.  The organization works to ensure that religious Jews can combine study at public 
universities with observance of Jewish law, fighting, for example, university administrations for 
dispensation from Saturday exams and attending to the problem of kosher food on campus.  It is 
also dedicated to elaborating cultural and ethnic conceptions of Jewishness, organizing talks on 
the Holocaust as well as “Jewish” vacations to New York and the Alps.  Because of this 
eclecticism, it attracts a broad swath of the young French Jewish population: “traditionalists”7 
and the militantly secular, leftists and right-wing sympathizers, the children of North African 
immigrants as well as (in smaller numbers) those of long-established Ashkenazi families.8  It 
may be one of the few French Jewish institutions that not only attracts a diverse membership but 
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also embraces its internal incoherence.  In the past, the UEJF has used promotional materials that 
ask: “Jewish student, are you a leftist?  Are you a rightist?  So come join the UEJF!” 
The demographic and ideological diversity within the UEJF’s ranks combined with the 
age and stage of its membership have translated into considerable political risk-taking.  In 1993, 
for example, the UEJF organized a series of talks entitled “the star [of David] has a date with the 
moon [crescent of Islam].”  One of those talks focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
included official spokespeople for the Palestinian cause, among them Hanan Ashrawi, the 
spokeswoman from the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace talks, and Afif Safieh, 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) representative in London.  Including official 
Palestinian voices was scandalous at the time.  For at least the previous decade, the CRIF had 
lobbied the French government to ban representatives of the PLO from French territory; in 
addition, most French Jewish organizations were wary of, if not hostile to, the peace process that 
would be crowned by the Oslo Accords (Trano 1995).  And indeed, the Fonds Social Juif Unifié, 
a Jewish fund-raising and social service organization, rebuked the UEJF for creating an 
environment hostile to the Israeli speakers.9 
But this tendency for political audacity was often mitigated by another factor.  The UEJF 
is a training ground for future leaders of the institutionalized Jewish community.  Yonathan Arfi, 
for example, is now vice president of the CRIF.  And he is in good company.  Of the ten men 
who have been President of the CRIF, three were previously UEJF presidents.10  The UEJF’s 
relationship with adult Jewish organizations has sometimes translated into quick retreats from 
iconoclastic positions.  This was true in 1993 when the UEJF was rebuked for allowing 
Palestinians to “silence” Israeli perspectives; the organization both defended its commitment to 
“hearing” all view points and denied its intention of letting members of the PLO speak.11  The 
point is that the UEJF is structurally positioned both to challenge establishment orthodoxy and to 
be disciplined by adult organizations.   
This certainly seems to be true with respect to the explicit positions the UEJF has taken in 
relation to anti-Semitism.  In early 2004, when mainstream Jewish organizations were defining 
anti-Semitism as an incommensurable form of racism (see above), the UEJF agreed	  (Bernard 
2004b).12  But then in October, it broke ranks with the CRIF and the LICRA by publicly 
entertaining (if not endorsing) the idea of a general anti-racist demonstration (Zappi 2004).  
Similarly, in the same year, the UEJF was playing with non-Jacobin understandings of national 
community while nonetheless embracing concerns about communautarisme.  In a 2004 book, 
Arfi queried whether there might be a way to think about distinctive “communities” within the 
French Republic without necessarily falling into or being taxed with communautarisme (UEJF 
2004:8–11).  In particular, he hoped that seeing people as tied to multiple communities, whether 
religious, cultural, and/or professional, would help mitigate the idea that communal identity 
meant mutually exclusive and oppositional allegiance (ibid.).  But at the same time, Arfi 
identified himself in interviews as a staunch Republican who feared “communities,” both Jewish 
and non-Jewish.  He worried about Jews responding to anti-Semitism through 
“communautarisme” and feared the public’s reduction of Jews to their ethno-religious identity, a 
reduction that he thought allowed the French public to see Jews and Muslims as “foreign” groups 
fighting an alien war on French soil.  And in 2005, Arfi also seemed to support ethnicized 
conceptions of the Republic, siding with the Jewish youth group that launched the petition 
accusing racialized minorities of “anti-white” and “anti-French” racism (Agence France Press 
2005).	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So where did the Jesus campaign fit among these positions?  Again, the answer is 
complicated.  In some ways, the UEJF’s campaign troubled Republican framings of French 
national identity.  If Republican imaginaries are rooted in the erasure of religious and ethnic 
particularities, the Jesus and Mary campaign foregrounded French religiosity.  It addressed the 
French public entirely through religious imagery, pairing a phrase meant to interpellate 
everyone—what if anti-Semitism were everyone’s concern?—with images that would most 
clearly have spoken to certain Christians, particularly Catholics.  As a result, instead of figuring 
the French public as an abstract collectivity united through adherence to a legal framework, the 
image conjured a French public motivated first and foremost by religiously-driven outrage at an 
attack on the Holy Family.  In addition, rather than make French Jews as an indistinguishable 
part of Republican France, the campaign introduced a split between the Jews authoring and 
“starring” in the ad, on the one hand, and the general “French” public to whom the campaign was 
supposed to speak, on the other.  Using Jesus and Mary as everyday victims of anti-Semitism 
operated as a proprietary claim, highlighting the continuity between the identity of the Holy 
Family and contemporary Jews.  At the same time, the treatment of Jesus and Mary as banal 
celebrities foregrounded the disconnect between Jewish sensibilities—in which Mary and Jesus 
play no sacred role—and those of the French public presumed to be reading the ad.  The 
campaign thus could be read as a Jewish plea for a non-Jewish “French” audience to accept a 
distinctively “Jewish” issue as its own concern. 
But if the campaign juxtaposed Jews with the wider French public, it also undermined 
that juxtaposition.  How?  This is particularly evident when imagining those not pictured in the 
ad, those who were supposed to have “tagged” Mary and Jesus.  Who were these invisible 
“tageurs”?  Was the UEJF implying that Muslims had defaced images of Jesus and Mary, 
thereby offending the sensibilities of Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and even post-Catholics?  
Once again, there is no straightforward answer.  As I will explain below, it is not clear that the 
UEJF intended the campaign to reduce Muslims to taguers.  But whoever filled that role, it 
collapsed the distance between Jewish “authors” and presumed French “readers,” rolling Jews 
back into a French body politic being attacked from an unseen outside.  Furthermore, imagining 
“Muslims” as that outside may have been overdetermined.  In 2004, the year of the UEJF 
campaign, politicians and the wider public were in a heated debate over whether and/or how the 
preamble to the European constitution should deal with Europe’s “Christian” or “Judeo-
Christian” heritage (Associated Press 2004; Bossuat 2005).  At the same time, dominant 
discourses widely conflated anti-Semitism with Islam, Muslims, and Arabo-Muslim anti-
Zionism (Finkielkraut 2003; Taguieff 2002; Brenner 2004).  When I asked an author of the ad 
campaign whether Jews felt “rejected by France,” she replied: “No.  There is a part of the Arab 
population13 that doesn’t like Jews [and] that says and does unacceptable things.”   
In a reading where Arabo-Muslims figure as invisible taguers, simultaneously attacking 
living Jews who both are and are not the same as sacrosanct Christian figures, the idea of a 
French Republican center is thoroughly transformed.  Rather than appear as a neutral legal 
framework into which Jews have been “integrated,” it appears as an ethno-religious community.  
This ethno-religious community partially excludes Jews in relation to the larger “French” reading 
public; but it also includes Jews in ways impossible for the invisible Muslim taguer.  It does so 
by using Jesus and Mary as ambiguous figures; figures who conjure up images of self-identified 
practicing Jews and serve as central symbols of and as a synecdoche for Christianity.  As a 
result, attacking Jews seems equivalent to attacking Christians or, at the very least, central 
symbols of Christian and Western civilization.  The invisibility of Islam in this semiotic 
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hologram of Jewishness and Christianity seemingly results in its definitive exclusion.  France is 
thus Christian and, to a certain extent, Jewish; it is not and cannot be Muslim. 
If one culturally informed reading of the campaign collapsed Republican and ethno-
national understandings of national community, the UEJF leadership also embraced a more 
radical alternative interpretation.  Here I return again to the campaign’s central if implicit 
question: who tagged Jesus and Mary?  When asked whether they intended to accuse Muslims of 
defacing Jesus and Mary, campaign designers said no.  Arfi told the press that Jesus and Mary 
were “Christian as well as Muslim figures that touched every French person” (Chabert 2004).  
Aubrey, a member of the design team, told a similar story.  During the planning stages, she 
consulted with a Muslim friend who claimed that the images touched her because of the 
importance of Mary in the Qur’an.  Would a wider-range of self-identified French Muslims have 
responded similarly?  It is impossible to know because of the campaign’s limited circulation.  
Some French Muslims certainly would have had trouble connecting Christian imagery with 
Islam.  But, as Aubrey’s informant suggested, Jesus and Mary do play a significant role in the 
Qu’ran, and they are viewed as consummate Muslims in some important oral traditions (c.f. 
Craigg 1985; Robinson 1991; Siddiqui 2013).  So it is possible that Aubrey’s token informant 
would not have been alone, particularly given the recent rise in Islamic education among French 
Muslims (see further Gray 2006).  The ad therefore could have positioned young French 
Muslims “returning” to religious practice as part of the religious hologram I described earlier.  
Rather than function as invisible taguers, Muslims might, like Christians, see themselves as like 
and unlike the campaign’s Jewish/Christian/Muslim Jesus and Mary and therefore as part of the 
wider “French” public to which the ad appealed. 
 But even for those ignorant of the role Jesus and Mary play in Islamic tradition, the 
image chosen for Mary further complicates exclusionary ethno-nationalist and Republican 
discourses about Islam and France.14  In the picture, Mary is veiled.  Although she is veiled 
according to the conventions of Western religious art, a veiled Jewish/Christian woman could be 
read as a challenge to the conflation of veiling with non-Western, non-French dispositions and 
practices (see further Baubérot 2004).  The mid-2000s “debate” about laïcité often placed 
Republicans and ethno-nationalists on the same side of seemingly anti-Muslim legislation.  From 
both perspectives, veiled women figured as too heteronomous (they submitted to male 
patriarchal norms and irrational religious demands) and/or too assertive (they intentionally 
challenged French cultural/political norms) to be appropriately French (Fernando 2014).  The 
UEJF campaign, however, suggested a very different role for a veiled woman, turning her from 
an aggressor into a symbol of those unjustly attacked in France.  
At the same time, a veiled Mary blurred the boundaries between the supposedly self-
evidently dichotomous categories Muslim and Jew.  With some exceptions, mainstream Jewish 
organizations, including religious institutions and newspapers, worked to maintain this 
dichotomy.  They supported restrictions on visible forms of Muslim practice (e.g. Meyer, 
Benattar, and Derai 1989; Gaulmyn 2003) despite the rapid increase in Jewish orthopraxy, which 
has gendered and behavioral norms that mirror those of observant Islam.  This paradoxical 
position worked to assert Jews’ relative proximity to “core” French identity whether figured as 
Republican or ethno-nationalist.  As one irate (non-Jewish?) reader of the Jewish press noted 
during the first headscarf affair in 1989: “Let’s be clear: prohibiting the kippa or the Jewish star 
in school, even in secular schools, would be an intolerable attack on human rights…  Christians 
AND JEWS are at home here…  Islam is waging a systematic offensive against our tolerant, 
Judeo-Christian society.  We cannot accept the wearing of the chador [sic] in class….” (Charrier 
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1990, emphasis in original).  Such arguments about the self-evident difference between Jewish 
and Muslim practice might be harder to maintain in the face of the continuity between the veil 
worn by Mary—here a symbol of observant Jewish womanhood—and those worn by 
contemporary Muslim women.  In other words, in much the same way that Mary and Jesus 
played with the boundaries between Judaism and Christianity, Mary’s veil might have disrupted 
distinctions between observant Jews and Muslims.  Far from being on opposite sides of a 
civilizational divide instantiated through Muslim anti-Semitism, the ad might suggest that 
religious Jews and Muslims shared as much as Jews and Christians. 
This reading of the Jesus and Mary campaign thus pulls viewers into a post-
“Andersonian” vision of the nation.  If Benedict Anderson (2006) rooted nationalism in 
horizontal fraternity and the ability to (at least) imagine core traits shared with fellow nationals, 
this particular reading of the UEJF campaign offers no such core.  Instead, it pictured France as a 
set of distinctive, internally fractured, and yet interconnected communities.  Jews, Protestants, 
Catholics, and Muslims were not positioned in identical ways vis-à-vis Jesus and Mary; but at 
the same time, religious groups were not hermetically sealed, internally undifferentiated 
communities.  Images of Jesus and Mary might alienate some traditionalist Muslims; but they 
also might alienate Protestants while speaking to youth newly interested in Islam.  Mary was not 
veiled like a contemporary Muslim woman; but some observant Jewish and Christian women 
also veil.15  Jesus was Jewish; but he was also a consummate Christian and Muslim.  And clearly 
although “secular” French sensibilities are different from those of observant Muslims, religious 
sensibilities haunt, shape, and even divide the entirety of the French public, not just its putatively 
religious “minorities.”  In other words, instead of posing French belonging as a question of 
identity, the Jesus campaign’s hologram-like images produced a French public rooted in fleeting 
moments of shared identification within and across religious boundaries.  Everyone reacting to 
the poster was pragmatically presumed to be French and a member of a religious community of 
some kind.  
And indeed, this is precisely what Arfi had said--in certain contexts--about French 
belonging.  His introduction to the edited volume mentioned above (UEJF 2004) normatively 
calls for the kind of national community just described; a national community peopled by 
distinctive and yet interconnected “communities” that can be interpellated in similar ways by 
similar kinds of concerns.  According to Arfi: “Everyone belongs to multiple communities.  
Religious, cultural, and even professional belonging define as many communities as there are 
reasons to get together to share, defend, or perpetuate a tradition or a culture…(ibid.:11).  
Similarly, he told me in 2005: “First, everyone lives in a community today…  Even the français 
de souche [a term used for unmarked French nationals]…lives in his own community…  Are 
there places of diversity and exchange?  At one time I had the impression that there were fewer, 
but I think they are now being reconstructed.”  If everyone, not only ethno-religious minorities, 
belongs to distinctive yet overlapping “communities,” it becomes hard to imagine visually 
depicting an embodied French cultural center.  From this perspective, the UEJF’s Jesus and Mary 
are not representatives of either “Christian” or “Judeo-Christian” France, but are simultaneously 
and alternately Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and French. 
 
Ambiguity and Danger 
 I have argued that the Jesus and Mary campaign was ambiguous, lending itself to very 
different culturally informed readings around what, if anything, constituted French national 
identity and belonging.  The campaign’s hypothetical French viewers could have read the images 
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of Mary and Jesus as indicating a Christian or Judeo-Christian foundation for French identity, 
thereby substituting an ethno-religious framework for a supposedly “neutral” Republican 
imaginary.  But French viewers equally could have seen a critique of the assumption that there is 
a clear “center,” whether ethno-religious or Republican, to French identity at all.  As I noted 
above, both of these positions had been articulated, sometimes simultaneously, by UEJF leaders.  
And both seemed to be circulating, whether as ideal promise or terrible nightmare, in the mid-
2000s French public sphere. 
  What I have yet to explain is why either or both of these possible readings were so 
alarming to the LICRA.  What did the LICRA fear?  And why call for the cancelation of the 
campaign?  In print, the group worried about fanning the flames of anger and division rather than 
extinguishing them (see above).  In private, the group apparently never fully told the UEJF what 
this meant.  They did tell Arfi they were concerned about how traditional Catholics would react 
to the profanation of Jesus and Mary.  They were also worried that Muslims would read the ad as 
accusation rather than invitation.  Both of these concerns point to one of my arguments—the 
campaign’s reliance on aesthetics rather than text made any attempt to control its message 
virtually impossible.  The ad could thus be offensive to Catholics and/or Muslims for mutually 
contradictory reasons.  For Catholics it might have been too “secular” an appropriation of sacred 
figures; for Muslims it seemed to render French belonging an exclusive possession of two sacred 
communities. 
 But either of the readings may also have threatened mainstream Jewish institutional 
approaches to French national belonging and anti-Semitism.  The LICRA—like many large 
French Jewish organizations—publicly embraced a Republican approach to thinking about 
national identity, linking the fight against anti-Semitism to the preservation of laïcité and the 
crushing of communautarisme.  In 2003, the LICRA and the Masonic Grand Orient organized a 
protest that they called “a Republican gathering for laïcité and against ethnic communalism, 
racism, and anti-Semitism” (Weill 2003).  Patrick Gaubert, then president of the LICRA, 
explained the protest:  
Yes.  We have to fight social fragmentation into ethno-religious communities and 
all of the racist and xenophobic currents that result from that fragmentation.  Our 
approach is above all to reaffirm the principles of the Republican slogan: equality, 
liberty, fraternity, to which we would add laïcité.  They are the four pillars of the 
Republic that everyone should have in mind (A. V. 2003).   
Just a year later, the LICRA invoked both secularism and Republicanism when it refused to fight 
anti-Semitism along with other forms of racism, particularly Islamophobia.  In debates over the 
scope and composition of protests against anti-Semitism, the LICRA made its position clear: it 
would not march with any anti-racist organizations that had refused to support the 2004 law 
banning veils in public schools, claiming that such groups were “avowed adversaries to the law 
for laïcité” and were therefore often “carriers of a violent anti-Semitism perpetrated in the name 
of anti-Zionism” (De Royer 2004).  By 2004, the LICRA’s fight for laïcité had become a fight 
against anti-Semitism, which in turn had become a metonym for racism itself.  At the same time, 
laïcité had become a dividing line distinguishing those with universalistic Republican values 
from those trying to impose communautarisme on the French public sphere.  In other words, the 
LICRA imagined the fight against anti-Semitism as a battle for a particular kind of French 
public, one visibly unmarked by religious or ethnic differences or divisions.   
 This was hardly an anomalous position.  Demonstrations against anti-Semitism 
throughout this period equated attacks on Jews and Jewish institutions with attacks on the 
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Republic itself, suggesting that Jews were a token, and sometimes even a synecdoche, for the 
French public.  For example, at the May 16, 2004 demonstration, protestors—including those 
affiliated with the UEJF—chanted “synagogues brulées, République en danger” [when 
synagogues burn, the Republic is in danger] and “juifs agressés, République en danger” [when 
Jews are attacked, the Republic is in danger].16  Roger Cukierman, at the time head of the CRIF, 
similarly linked the fight against anti-Semitism to the reinforcement of Republican legal 
frameworks.  When asked in September 2004 what the “Jewish community needed” in 
contemporary France, he noted:  
What we need is that anti-Semitic incidents cease.  That’s is all we need, because 
we are citizens who are perfectly well integrated into this country, we have no 
problem with integration, Jews have lived in France for hundreds of years, we are 
an integral part of French society, the only problem that we have today is a wave 
of anti-Semitic acts that is unacceptable for Jews and unacceptable for France.   
He further argued that “there [was] an enormous amount of work that has to be done by French 
society, that was always done for other immigrant groups from Europe, that has not been done 
for Muslims… [O]ne of the reasons for the wave of anti-Semitism that we are experiencing is 
[Muslims’] insufficient integration into French society.”  In other words, Jews long ago joined 
the French Republican center as “integrated” citizens; Muslim anti-Semitism was thus one of the 
most important signs of Muslims’ failure to follow suit. 
Note that in this logic, as in our first reading of the UEJF images, Jews are contrasted 
with Muslims and given considerably greater proximity to (if not complete identity with) a 
“core” French public.  But not for the same reasons as those implied by the Jesus and Mary 
campaign.  For the LICRA and CRIF, Jews are model minorities whose insider-outsider status 
testifies to the capacity of the Republic to integrate all willing to abide by its contractual 
principles (Fernando 2009).  In such an imaginary, Muslims are not excluded on essentialized 
grounds, but because they cannot or will not adapt to French Republican rules, whether around 
sex equality, religious visibility, or tolerance.  As an economics teacher who occasionally wrote 
thought pieces for the CRIF explained to me, saying anything else implied that the Republic was 
by nature exclusionary, and therefore an ethnonational institution.  But the Jesus and Mary 
campaign disrupted the assumption that “the Republic” can be clearly distinguished from “the 
nation.”  When a self-identified “Republican” Jewish group uses the bodies of Jesus and Mary to 
incarnate the French national community, it indirectly highlights how closely tied Republican 
and ethno-religious imaginaries often are.  And this changes how one can think about Muslims’ 
supposed failure to integrate.  The LICRA, like many mainstream Jewish organizations, has 
preferred to attribute such “failures” to non-Jewish minorities themselves and/or to French civil 
society rather than to the nature of French national identity.  As a result, when the LICRA 
supported the petition against “anti-white” racism, a petition that argued that “Jews” and the 
“French” were equally and indistinguishably targets of dark-skinned, often Muslim, delinquents, 
it denied understanding the firestorm provoked by its position.  Where outraged commentators 
understood the petition to imply that “France” was a white/Jewish/Christian ethno-nation 
(Agence France Press 2005), the LICRA insisted that there was “no source of polemic” in the 
appeal because “the facts speak for themselves;” the delinquents, not those who called attention 
to their “racism,” were the anti-Republican communautaristes (Agence France Presse 2005b).  At 
that point, long after the LICRA’s condemnation of the Jesus and Mary campaign, the UEJF 
agreed (Agence France Press 2005).  
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 Reading the Jesus and Mary campaign as a statement about France’s fundamentally 
Judeo-Christian character undermined Jewish institutions’ attempt to figure Jews as a model 
minority who proved the potential inclusiveness of the French Republic.  But reading the 
campaign in a way that evacuated the “center” of Frenchness, however imagined, may have been 
even more unsettling to Jewish institutional strategies.  In a period of seeming indifference to 
rising anti-Semitism, fear of transnational identities, distrust of embodied religiosity, and 
negative images of Israel, Jewish institutions used the fight against anti-Semitism to shore up 
Jewish claims to French national belonging, (see further Arkin 2014).  In other words, although 
France’s postcolonial discussion of pluralism very often revolves around Islam, French Jews do 
not feel the “Jewish question” has been resolved.  To this postcolonial “Jewish question,” many 
French Jewish institutions offer a postcolonial solution that rests on some of the shifting forms of 
triangulation involved in colonial constructions of difference (see further Katz 2015).  French 
colonial practice opened and closed the possibility of assimilation by elaborating a set of ethno-
racial distinctions within colonized populations, turning, for example, Algerian “Berbers” and 
“Jews” into groups with religious, political, and even racial characteristics imagined as more 
“French” than those associated with “Arabs” (Lorcin 2014; Shepard 2008; Shepard 2013; 
Silverstein 2004; for exceptions see, Stein 2014).  This colonial logic produced Frenchness 
through distinctions worked out among excluded groups; a French “majority” and a series of 
differentially assimilable “minorities” were thus co-constructions.  The continuous juxtaposition 
of Jews and Muslims, or Jews and Arabs, that haunts many Jewish responses to French anti-
Semitism—whether those responses are “Republican,” “ethnonationalist,” or somewhere in 
between—reproduces this colonial logic, making Jewish inclusion in France contingent on Arab-
Muslim exclusion.  In other words, Jews and Muslims are juxtaposed as a way of arguing for the 
difference between Jews’ (potentially troubling) religious practices, bodies, allegiances, and 
origins, and those of Arab-Muslims.  
Given this postcolonial solution, a Jesus and Mary campaign that evacuates a national 
“core” troubles all attempts to negotiate Jewish belonging through Muslim exclusion.  If 
Muslims, Jews, and Christians share the same kind of partial and fractal relationship with one 
another and with French identity, the postcolonial ground for Jewish inclusion disappears.  In 
showing how Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Muslims might be seen as the same and different, 
divided and yet potentially punctually unified, the UEJF inadvertently called attention to the 
essentialism that haunts how Jewish organizations cope with French Jewish liminality. 
 
Conclusion 
I began by pleading for an analytical return to the “Jewish question.”  I want to conclude 
in the same vein, highlighting how attention to certain forms of Jewish agency may help 
elucidate contemporary European nationalism.  Over the last few decades, scholars exploring the 
challenges to national identity associated with contemporary capitalism and post-coloniality have 
asked whether nation-states have futures and whether those futures can resemble national pasts 
(e.g. Appadurai 1996; Bunzl 2003; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Geschiere 2009; Hall 1991).  
In Europe, ethno-religious minorities are thought of as harbingers of new, post-“Andersonian” 
imaginaries, (unintentional) agents of the deconstruction and radical reconstruction of national 
communities, (e.g. Asad 2003; Erickson 2011; Bunzl 2004; Fernando 2014; Lehrer 2013).  And 
yet, at the same time, social science about European nation-states, particularly France, often 
presumes that deep cultural and/or social continuities produce recognizably “national” publics 
with shared dispositions and practices; “national” publics that (still) struggle with the 
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“incorporation” of minorities—most notably Muslims—who challenge national cultures (Bowen 
2007; Cesari 2014; Hervieu-Léger 2000; Laurence and Vaisse 2005; Roy 1999; Schnapper 1998; 
see Fernando 2014 for an account that substitutes secularity for culture). 
 Between these understandings—the nation-state is dead, long live the nation-state—we 
are left to conclude that “minorities” are either revolutionary vanguards of a new world order or 
abject bodies on which the Andersonian nation is built.  But such an understanding obscures the 
investment that (some) minorities make in the homogenous nation over and against alternative 
visions that seem to offer greater possibilities for pluralism.  Terry Turner (1995) has made this 
point from a materialist perspective in relation to the resurgence of ethno-nationalism in much of 
contemporary Europe.  He has argued that ethno-nationalist claims are often made by dominated 
fractions of the dominant population, factions that are seeking “inclusion and integration on more 
favorable social, political and economic terms.”  What Turner noted for disenfranchised whites 
may also be true for similarly positioned minority groups.17  The UEJF ad campaign 
(accidently?) called attention to Jewish institutions’ reliance on and contributions to French 
ethno-nationalism in their fight against anti-Semitism (Arkin 2016), thus revealing the terrible 
structural limits on how French Jews can respond to the postcolonial “Jewish question.” 
 In other words, the French “Jewish question” highlights how contingent Jewish 
Frenchness may still be and therefore how shallow French pluralism really is, even for 
“minority” groups who are seemingly “integrated.”  If Jewish “integration” partially relies on 
Muslim exclusion, neither an essentialist nor a successionist story can explain why Muslims 
cannot be of, and not just in, European nation-states like France.  Instead, social scientists should 
pay attention to the fraught ways in which national centers are both contested and produced from 
variously constituted margins (Joskowicz 2014).  An exclusive focus on Islam as post-national 
promise or national problem fails to show how important imagined relations between and among 
“minority” groups maybe to (re)thinking the nation. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a critique of how “positivistic” anthropological data is or should be, see further (Herzfeld 2015). 
2 This kind of analysis also has a long and storied history in some anthropological traditions, particularly structural 
and symbolic anthropology.  Both of these approaches make explicit what was assumed to be mostly infra-conscious 
to natives themselves (e.g. Douglas 2004; Lévi-Strauss 1983; Turner 1970). 
3 For accounts of the relative overdetermination of post-colonial Jewish Frenchness, see further (Katz 2015; Mandel 
2014; Shepard 2013). 
4 This argument has been made, indirectly, by Zygmunt Bauman (2001).  For the most obvious examples, see further 
(Durkheim 1984; Durkheim 1995; Marx 1978; Simmel 1964).  
5 For exceptions, see further (Arkin 2014; Boyarin 2009; Bunzl 2004; Brink-Danan 2012). 
6 See (Boyarin 2009; Mandel 2008) for more complex takes on this issue. 
7 “Traditionalist” refers to Jews who observe some aspects of Jewish Law, particularly those that help mark Jewish 
boundaries. 
8 Between the 1950s and the 1980s, an estimated 55,000 Tunisian, 50,000 Moroccan, and 125,000 Algerian Jews 
immigrated to France (Bensimon 1971:2; Laskier 1983:342; Taieb 1989:57).  In the 1980s, a major French Jewish 
organization estimated that about half of the French Jewish population was Sephardi, a term correlated with North 
African origins in France (Cohen 2002:12).  By 2002, that number had reached 70%.  
9 Fax with Agence Juive and Fonds Social Juif Unifié letterhead found in the informal UEJF archives.  Dated May 
26th, 1993.  
10 Théo Klein, UEJF president from 1947-1951; CRIF president from 1983-1989. 
Andy Steg, president of the Paris section of UEJF from 1947-1949, CRIF president from 1970-1974. 
Jean Kahn, president of the Strasbourg section of UEJF from 1950-1952, CRIF president from 1989-1995. 
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11 In the UEJF archives, I found a letter inviting Leila Shahid, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s official 
representative in Paris (dated April 29, 1993).  But subsequent correspondence between the UEJF and other Jewish 
organizations denied the intention of having a PLO representative speak. 
12 Arfi explained to me in an interview: “We can’t combat racism and anti-Semitism with the same methods because 
they are not the same thing…  Racism is the hatred of the person we see, the black who we see, who we recognize as 
foreign.  The hatred of Jews is that of those who we don’t recognize, who we don’t see.  The difference is inside.  It 
doesn’t come from the same thing in the head…  All of that makes that it’s something of a completely different 
nature…”  
13 It is interesting that this particular UEJF member used the term “Arab” rather than “Muslim;” both are potentially 
equally inappropriate descriptors of an extremely diverse, often but not always ex-colonial population, see further 
(Bowen 2009 Chapter 1).  But note also that the campaign itself encouraged people to think about identity almost 
exclusively in religious (rather than ethnic or cultural) terms. 
14 I have to thank Naomi Davidson for pointing this out to me. 
15 Former Presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicholas Sarkozy sought to have (some) Catholic nuns exempted from laws 
that required them to remove their head coverings in certain contexts, like official identity photographs. 
16 In 2004, the Commision nationale consultative des droits de l’homme [CNCDH, National advisory committee on 
human rights] documented a 50% increase in anti-Semitic acts and a 100% increase in anti-Maghrebin acts; but 
protesters marching with Jewish-affiliated groups did not mention burning mosques or attacking Muslims as 
evidence of an embattled Republic (Agence France Presse 2005a; CRIF 2005). 
17 Ari Joskowicz (2014) has argued this in a different way in a compelling account of Jewish anti-Catholicism in 
France and Germany in the 19th century.  Where Joskowicz sees center-periphery models as illusions created by 
particular historical approaches or theoretical proclivities, I see them as socially generated and maintained; historical 
actors themselves produce and mobilize simplified understandings of complicated social realities. 
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